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3Beyond Latour and Heidegger or:  
How to avoid conceptual gaps 
when clarifying human sociality
by  
Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) seeks to overcome the micro-macro gap in social 
theory. It aims to do so by abolishing the distinction between, on the one hand, 
individuals and, on the other, socio-material structures. This article argues, how-
ever, that ANT has not sufficiently managed to close t he gap because it fails to take 
a particular kind of social relation into account. It leaves aside early infant-caregiv-
er dyads whose mode of coordination does not fit ANT’s socio-material ontology. 
With the purpose of avoiding a gap in relation to human social relations, the arti-
cle presents an account of the phenomenon ‘phenomenal distance’. Specifically, it 
explores how the transition from unskilled to skilled socio-material engagements 
can be clarified by reference to embodied habits. Thus, it accounts for how the un-
skilled individual comes to participate in social practices.
1. The ‘micro-macro gap’ in Actor-Network Theory
Considering our everyday life, it makes good sense to follow Latour’s
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) by assuming that human sociality is based
on materiality. We not only live amidst objects including houses, cars
and TVs but also use these as mediators of our relations with others.
Consequently, socio-practical relations and conventions tend to shape the 
ways we relate to other people by making use of things. Latour presents 
ANT as a descriptive theory that has no apparent interest in answering
the ‘why’-question related to human sociality. Proponents of ANT thus
describe socio-material relations and leave aside how socio-material
networks emerge. Nevertheless, Latour hints at the constitutional issue 
BEYOND LATOUR AND HEIDEGGER
4 5
RASMUS GAHRN-ANDERSEN - RASK NO. 46
when arguing that ANT avoids the traditional micro-macro gap in social 
theory. In so doing, he alludes to how sociologists have made unsucces-
sful attempts at closing the gap between on the one hand, individuals 
(i.e. the micro) and, on the other, social structures (i.e. the macro) (cf. 
Turner & Boynes 2006). For Latour, they have failed to do so because 
they consider the gap as an objective fact. He contests this idea, arguing 
that the gap is merely a conceptual distinction. One must thus develop an 
adequate terminology for describing social phenomena, and the solution, 
he claims, is ANT. Latour writes: 
The notion of network allows us to dissolve the micro macro-distinc tion 
that has plagued social theory from its inception. The whole metaphor 
of scales going from the individual, to the nation state, through family, 
extended kin, groups, institutions etc. is replaced by a metaphor  
of connections (Latour 1996: 5). 
Although Latour self-confidently states that ANT-terminology avoids the 
micro-macro gap, my argument is that ANT leaves out key social relations. 
In fact, ANT opens another gap by using a terminology which makes the 
assumption that the social and the material are intertwined. In so doing, 
ANT neglects an important aspect of human social reality by adopting 
a socio-materialistic ontology that conflates phenomena in social and 
material aspects. This conflation is reflected in ANT’s notion of actor.1 
For Latour, we humans cannot be separated from material engagements. 
Because without materiality
human actors would remain, even in the midst of the best-designed 
frame, unable to interpret what is giving: they would remain as  
unconnected to the meaning of [a given] site as a cat prowling 
on Acropolis (Latour 2005: 206).
For Latour, humans are essentially characterised by sense-making activi-
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ties which revolve around material objects (2005: 205). As actors, however, 
we partake in networks, meaning that materiality plays a vital enabling 
condition for not only our social relations but also our sense-making. In 
short, human existence is partially material.
Inspired by Trevarthen’s work (1979; 1993), on the other hand, Gallagher 
(2011) shows that it makes good sense to treat social reality as comprised 
of, not only ANT-style socio-material relations, but also what he calls 
proto-social relations. Accordingly, he distinguishes between two kinds of 
infant intersubjectivity. This conceptual distinction is also found in the work 
by Tomasello (1995) where human social reality appears to have a twofold 
nature. In Gallagher’s terms, this appears as two kinds of intersubjectivity:
1)  The first characterises the children from birth and is synonymous 
with innate or early-developed sensory-motor capacities that 
bring the child into relation with others and allow him/her to interact  
with them (Gallagher 2011: 60).
2)  The second kind of intersubjectivity emerges when children are 
around one year of age and actively “begin to co-constitute the  
meaning of the world in their interactions with others”  
(Gallagher 2011: 62).
In primary intersubjectivity, child and caretaker engage in dyadic coor-
dination (cf. Trevarthen 1979). Early interaction draws heavily on basic 
embodied gestures including mimesis, touch, voice and gaze following. 
Here, coordination does not involve manipulation of extrinsic objects. 
Rather, it constitutes a primary kind of sociality deemed proto-social in 
that it is simpler than later sociality and phenomena that include socie-
ties, organizations etcetera. By contrast, secondary intersubjectivity is 
synonymous with the socio-material networks that ANT explores. At this 
point, the child engages in triadic interactions, meaning that s/he not 
only relates to the caretaker but also to impersonal thirds (i.e. material 
objects). S/he thus engages in what Trevarthen (1979) calls triadic coor-
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dination. This kind of coordination can then develop into more complex 
social interactions. 
ANT’s conceptual distinction between proto-sociality and socio-ma-
terial relations has many problematic consequences. In what follows, I 
argue that it undermines Latour’s attempt to dissolve the micro-macro 
gap because it commits ANT to a strictly socio-materialistic ontology. 
For this reason, ANT ignores proto-social relations that are dyadic and 
that, for the same reason, do not revolve around things and objects. 
Further, it underlines why the ANT perspective cannot overcome the 
micro-macro gap without giving rise to a new gap. By focusing exclusively 
on socio-material reality, ANT keeps silent about proto-social relations. As 
a result, ANT faces an unresolved constitutional issue which arises from 
its failure to clarify how proto-sociality evolves into socio-material reality. 
For self-evident reasons, ANT is of little help due to its self-proclaimed 
status as a descriptive theory and explicit commitment to a socio-mate-
rialistic ontology. Consequently, we need to go beyond ANT in order to 
avoid creating a new gap.
2. An appeal to phenomenology
A way to avoid a gap when clarifying social relations is by exploring human 
sociality from a phenomenological perspective and, more specifically, by 
using this to pursue the phenomenon of distance. Before making this step 
in the argument, it is imperative to consider what a phenomenological 
perspective entails.
One might be inclined to think that human phenomenology is re-
ducible to the self-conscious subject’s point of view, or what Descartes 
first introduced as the cogito. Yet, in the first chapter of Being and Time, 
Heidegger argues that human existence involves more than what can be 
revealed by a cogito – or: an I think. He stresses that a Cartesian termino-
logy is unsuitable for a phenomenological analysis since it ignores human 
existential attitudes that enable each of us to relate to our surroundings. 
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For Heidegger,
the intention of the existential analytic can be clarified by considering 
Descartes, to whom one attributes the discovery of the cogito sum as  
the point of departure for all modern philosophical questioning.  
He investigates the cogitare of the ego – within certain limits. 
But the sum he leaves completely undiscussed, even though it is  
just as primordial as the cogito (2010: 45).
The focus of phenomenological research is therefore not limited to a 
subject’s consciousness because this would neglect how subjects actively 
stand over against, and are situated in, ‘the world.’ Reference to the sum 
thus picks out what, for Heidegger, is lost in Cartesian approaches that 
aim to clarify the cogito - or: the existence of the experiencing subject.2 
Heidegger consequently introduces the concept of Dasein which, literally 
translated, means being there. Dasein designates the being who questions 
itself in its being as one who “is always we ourselves”. Consequently, the 
“being of this being [Dasein] is always mine” (2010: 41). For this reason, 
Dasein should not be seen as cogito + sum. Heidegger underlines this when 
he counters Augustine who rhetorically asks “But what is closer to me 
than myself?”, by stating that what “is ontically nearest and familiar is 
ontologically the farthest” (2010: 43). Heidegger introduces human exi-
stence – or: Dasein – as the ontological precedent for reflective subjectivity 
and, hence, the Cartesian cogito. Instead, Dasein is characterized by its 
immediate being- in-the-world which for Heidegger is synonymous with 
our average everydayness i.e. our pre-reflective socio-material engagements 
with things and people. 
Heidegger and Latour have somewhat comparable views on human 
subjectivity. Latour assumes that human sense-making per definition 
involves a relation to something material, be it a tool or some other 
thing (cf. above). ANT’s notion of actor is thus broadly in accord with 
Heidegger’s view that the relation between subject and thing is a basic 
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constituent of human existence. In placing Dasein first, Heidegger also 
gives weight to how humans partake in material engagements. Specifically, 
this is underlined in the primordial existential attitude of care (‘Sorge’) 
which Heidegger presents as the ontological prerequisite for human 
existence (2010: 57). We humans exist as Dasein, he argues, because we 
take care of things and people. Heidegger considers caring as our basic 
existential attitude. It is when taking care of something that we engage 
with the world. This means that all reflective attitudes derive from our 
immediate relation with the world and its objects: 
Dasein is never “initially” a sort of being which is free from being-in,  
but which at times is in the mood to take up a “relation” to the world. 
This taking up of relations to the world is possible only because,  
as being-in-the-world, Dasein is as it is (2010: 57).
But we cannot use Heidegger’s account to avoid a gap with regards to 
dif erent kinds of social relations. Following Brandom, this is because 
Heidegger’s phenomenology assumes “the ontological primacy of the 
social” (Brandom 2005: 216). More specifically, Heidegger asserts the pri-
macy of our skillful socio-material relations – a point on which I expatiate 
in the next section. Given the primacy of the social, Heidegger neither 
can, nor expresses any interest in wanting to, explain the constitution 
of human socio-material reality and, for the same reason, how Dasein 
comes into existence. Rather, Dasein is taken for granted in the sense 
that Heidegger presupposes the social nature of the human subject in 
its various existential modes. One indication of this is that he refers to 
Dasein as a being having certain traits that ‘always-already’ pertain to it. 
This relates to the fact that Dasein, on Heidegger’s view, lacks a point of 
origin and, for that matter, any constitutive logic. Heidegger emphasizes 
this when stating that the world is given beforehand to Dasein: 
Things at hand are encountered within the world [which] is already 
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discovered beforehand together with everything encountered, although 
not thematically […]. World is that in terms of which things at hand are at 
hand for us (2010: 81-82).
Heidegger thus takes the socio-material nature of human existence for 
granted. Nevertheless, it may well be possible to account for at least 
one vital aspect of Dasein’s constitution by appealing to Heidegger’s 
phenomeno logical philosophy. 
3.  Uncovering phenomenological distance and the nearness of socio- 
material relations
Despite Heidegger’s narrow view on human sociality, I hold that we can 
avoid a conceptual gap when we clarify social relations by turning to 
phenomenological distance. More specifically, we can do so by focusing 
on nearness. Before presenting an account of nearness, however, I stress 
that the fundamental importance of this kind of distance appears in 
Heidegger’s writings. He argues that human individuals typically relate 
to things at hand which, consequently, are nearby (‘in der Nähe’). As we 
shall see, however, his notion of nearness involves a degree of distance 
and, for this reason, should not be considered as a primordial nearness. 
Below, I argue that Heidegger’s notion of distance pertains to subjects who 
are already partaking in socio-material practices and, for this reason, are 
necessarily able to engage with things and people in a skillful manner. 
For Heidegger, human existence involves phenomenological distance. 
But this kind of distance difers from its ‘objective’ counterpart (i.e. that 
which is represented by Euclidean space). For as Heidegger posits: “[w]hat 
is supposedly ‘nearest’ is by no means that which has the smallest distance 
‘from us’” (2010: 104). Phenomenological distance cannot be ‘mea sured’ 
by appeal to the metric system or any other ‘objectifying’ system of me-
asurement. On the contrary, this kind of distance is to be understood 
in strict phenomenological terms, in the sense that it is relative to our 
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embodiment, experience and engagement with the world.
Heidegger argues that Dasein’s everyday activities play out in social 
practices through skillful relations with tools and other useful things (cf. 
Brandom 2005: 218). These socio-material engagements are characterized 
by a degree of phenomenal distance, since we bring certain aspects of the 
world near as we engage with things. For as Heidegger states, “things at 
hand of everyday dealings have the character of nearness” (2010: 100). 
A thing must be within reach in order for us to take hold of it. Also, he 
points out that “things constantly at hand, with which circumspect being-
in-the-world reckons from the outset, have their place” (2010: 101). The 
fact that things ‘have their place’ implies that, in terms of distance, they 
are phenomenologically situated as a there: 
Place is always the definite “over there” and the “there” of a useful 
thing belonging there. In each and every case belonging there  
corresponds to the useful character of what is at hand (2010: 100).
When things are ‘at hand’ they are near as a there. The fact that they are 
experienced as ‘over there’ rather than here underlines that Heidegger’s 
notion of nearness involves a minimum of distance. When it comes to 
Dasein, we experientially relate to the purposes of things, and not to the 
things themselves (i.e. things considered in isolation). For as Heidegger 
puts it, it is “[t]he work we primarily encounter when we deal with things 
and take care of them” (2010: 69). Our practical dealings with things 
transcend the things themselves, meaning that the there of a particular 
thing is constituted by means of our practical orientation towards it and 
the fact that we actively use it in relation to a concrete purpose. Pheno-
menologically, the thing is a thing-in-use.
But the nearness of the there is not a primordial phenomenological 
near ness. The reason for this is the following: A phenomenal there 
tacitly presupposes that the human subject (qua its Dasein) is already 
socialized and has acquired sufficient practical knowledge and skills. 
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Thus, the subject can use everyday tools and objects without reflecting 
on what these things are, how to use them, and so on. In other words, our 
practical knowledge lets us take care of things: it allows for thing-in-use 
to be a category. Accordingly, we pre-reflectively engage in socio-mate-
rial relations and, by so doing, partake in social practices. However, our 
primordial material engagements are far from skillful and, hence, do not 
involve a there.3 This is implicit in the fact that human practical relations 
are not just based on a tacit understanding of what a given thing is and 
can be used for, but also on how it feels to use the thing. As Malafouris 
rightly notes, our material engagements typically involve “thinking and 
feeling with” things (2014: 143). As we skillfully engage with a thing, 
we experientially transcend it. To paraphrase Heidegger: when using 
a hammer to put a nail in a wall, we focus on its purpose (its relation to 
the nail and the wall), and not on the hammer by itself. By doing so, we 
experientially transcend the hammer in its phenomenal presence: its 
here. Phenomenologically, however, useful things themselves are nearer 
to us than is their functional there. The hammer will always be closer 
to us than are the nail and the wall. Nevertheless, we are practically 
concerned with the latter when using the hammer.
Besides, Heidegger notes, for practical usage to be smooth, we must 
refrain from reflecting on how things appear to us since:
the less we just stare at the thing called hammer, the more we take  
hold of it and use it, the more original our relation to it becomes and  
the more undisguisedly it is encountered as what it is, as a useful  
thing (Heidegger 2010: 69).
Sutton (2007) also underlines the importance of abstaining from reflecting 
on one’s skilled actions as one performs them. For instance, being a good 
cricketer implies that, when batting, one must avoid thinking about what 
one is doing. Instead, one should enact a flow and ‘live’ (rather than ‘think’) 
one’s relation to the bat and the ball. The same holds for many of our everyday 
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activities including taking part in first-order language, or languaging (cf. 
Cowley 2011). For instance, some might have a hard time remembering the 
pin code of their credit card when they are not in front of an ATM and fail 
to enact their pre-reflective, embodied memory of the pin code.
Heidegger argues that we do not really notice the useful things in 
themselves, unless they suddenly come to have a weird feel or break 
down. For Heidegger, the pre-reflective subject starts focusing on things 
themselves when they have stopped working, and a shift in attention 
occurs. The thing itself is now the focal point because it has become 
conspicuous (‘aufallend’) (2010: 72). Also, its there has disappeared, 
since the thing is no longer being used in relation to its purpose. Thus, 
the subject has stopped being concerned about the thing’s purpose. This 
underlines that a useless thing lacks the thereness of a useful thing: in 
fact, the here of the useless thing has taken its place.
In our everyday practical dealings, useful things have phenomenal 
presence when we use them. The same does not hold for things that are 
useless: useless things are of no use. I hold that, in terms of phenomen-
ological nearness, a useful thing is present as a tacit here. The useful 
hammer is obviously present in the sense that we experience it. But we 
do not focus on it as such. Rather, we focus on the hammer’s purpose, 
and, consequently, on its there. Only in a tacit manner do we experience 
the fully functioning hammer as being here. For this reason, the tacit 
here is synonymous with the phenomenal presence of a thing-in-use. 
And the here is ‘tacit’ because we experientially transcend the thing by 
using it. The functional breakdown of the thing, however, involves a shift 
in phenomenological distance from there to here or: from purpose (qua 
thing-in-use) to the considered thing itself. 
But why even bother with phenomenal distance? We have seen that 
skilled socio-material relations imply two kinds of nearness: in social 
practices, the subject is phenomenally relating to not only a there but 
also a tacit here. But this does not hold for other kinds of social relations 
(including dyadic coordination), or when an unskilled subject partakes 
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in triadic coordination (see, for instance, Perinat & Sadurni 1999). Un-
fortunately, due to his focus on the skilled individual (i.e. its Dasein), 
Heidegger does not ofer any clarification on the social relations preceding 
Dasein: he has no interest in investigating what we could call pre-Dasein. 
I hold that, notwithstanding this, it is possible to account for the transi-
tion from pre-Dasein to Dasein by considering phenomenal distance. In 
fact, by doing so, we also avoid opening up a new conceptual gap when 
clarifying human social relations.
4. Avoiding the gap: From ‘overt here’ to ‘there’ 
Having argued that the there of our skilled material engagements involves 
a tacit here, I now turn to phenomenological distance and, specifically, 
to the two kinds of nearness and the way they are related. I do so in order 
to clarify the transition from proto-sociality to socio-material relations 
or, in Heideggerian terms, the transition from pre-Dasein to Dasein. But 
first I will show that human sociality involves two varieties of nearness, 
‘tacit’ and ‘overt’. 
Clearly, the tacit here present in Heidegger’s account concerns re-
lations with things-in-use and presupposes, at least historically, what 
Trevarthen (1979) calls triadic coordination. These relations involve a 
skilled subject (i.e. a Dasein) who has experience in using certain things, 
performing certain routines etc. This is the one kind of nearness. However, 
a here also characterizes proto-social relations, but does so in a slightly 
diferent way. As shown in Gahrn-Andersen & Cowley (2017), an important 
component of early infant socializing occurs in infant-caregiver dyads and 
triads, with the caregiver exposing the child to normative perturbations. 
In part because of these extrinsic influences, the child comes to construe 
her agency in ways that accord with social norms and expectations; in 
other words, the presence of the caregiver entails a phenomenal here. In 
fact, this phenomenal presence is key to understanding how toddlers, over 
time, can adapt to their surroundings; consequently phenomenal nearness 
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not only pertains to our own skilled material engagements, but also to 
the child’s experiences of the caregiver’s touches and gestures, including 
the caregiver's introduction of objects. In other words, the pheno menal 
here is foundational to both proto-sociality (i.e. pre-Dasein) and skilled 
socio-material engagements (i.e. Dasein). The proto-social notion of the 
here, however, is at odds with Heidegger’s account, which assumes that 
here is derived from our skillful material engagements (cf. Heidegger 
2010: 73). This is the other kind of nearness, which I will call overt. We 
must therefore go beyond Heidegger’s Dasein-phenomenology in order 
to explain the transition from proto-sociality to social material relations 
or, more specifically, the transition from here to there. 
To sum up, human sociality involves at least two diferent kinds of 
phenomenal nearness. First, the nearness of proto-social relations is 
manifested as an overt here. Here, the subject experiences something 
or someone. The subject is unskilled and for this reason does not orient 
him/herself towards a practical purpose (i.e. a there). Second, in skilled 
socio-material relations, the subject – or: Dasein – skillfully uses a thing in 
relation to a purpose. The here of these socio-material relations is tacit 
in that it is experientially transcended: the skilled individual focuses on 
the thing’s purpose. In other words, both a tacit here and a there which 
is overtly experienced are involved here. 
Now, how do we explain the transition from proto-sociality to so-
cio-material engagements that rely on skill? This we can do by reference 
to habits. The constitutive nature of habits is underlined by Merleau-Ponty 
who, famously, invokes a blind man navigating his surroundings with 
the aid of a stick. For Merleau-Ponty, the man’s skilled use of the stick 
entails an experiential transcendence of the stick. Rather than being 
preoccupied with the stick itself, the blind man relates to surrounding 
objects by means of the stick. Thus, the skillful use of the stick opens a 
phenomenal space of potentialities (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2010: 166). Mer-
leau-Ponty argues that skilled use is only possible if one has acquired 
habits in using the thing in question. For this reason, habits are essential 
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to our daily routines. As Noë rightly observes, they comprise
basic and foundational aspects of our mental lives. Without habit,  
there is no calculation, no speech, no thought, no recognition,  
no game playing. Only a creature with habits like ours could have 
anything like a mind like ours (Noë 2009: 125).
Our habitual dispositions enable us to partake in socio-material practices 
and, hence, become Dasein (in Heidegger’s sense) because, as he would 
explain, they enable the experiential transition from here to there. Habits 
allow for the constitution of a thing-in-use. In other words, they enable us 
to transcend the presence of given thing (i.e. a here) as we skilfully relate 
the thing to its purpose (i.e. the there). In other words, habits permit the 
smooth usage that characterises our skilled everyday dealings such as 
biking, turning on the heater and talking. In this connection, habits imply 
more than a “motor grasping of a motor significance” (Merleau-Ponty 
2010: 165). Compare also that for Durkheim it is 
patently obvious that all education consists of a continual efort to 
impose upon the child ways of seeing, thinking and acting which he 
himself would not have arrived at spontaneously. From his earliest  
years we oblige him to eat, drink and sleep at regular hours, and  
to observe cleanliness, calm and obedience; later we force him to 
learn how to be mindful of others, to respect customs and conventions, 
and to work, etc. If this constraint in time ceases to be felt it is because 
it gradually gives rise to habits, to inner tendencies which render it  
superfluous; but they supplant the constraint only because they are  
derived from it (Durkheim 1982: 53-54).
The social nature of our habits is brought out by the fact that they need to 
be more than just individual in the sense that they pertain to the subject’s 
embodiment.4 As Schatzki shows, we become social actors by acting in 
accordance with social expectations and norms (cf. Schatzki 2013: 189). 
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It is in part due to our embodied habits that we acquire the social status 
needed for partaking in the relations constitutive of social practices. 
Thus, habits are foundational to human sociality.
5. Wrapping it up
Latour is mistaken in his claim that his ANT succeeds in bridging the 
micro-macro gap of social theory because ANT imposes its own gap by 
neglecting what have been termed ‘proto-social’ relations. Specifically, 
ANT opens a gap between, on the one hand, dyadic, and on the other, 
triadic coordination. Inspired by Heidegger, I therefore introduce phen-
omenal distance to avoid creating a new gap in human sociality.  This 
is done, first, by changing the ANT gap, such that it separates unskilled 
social relations that are either dyadic or triadic (i.e. pre-Dasein), from a 
triadic coordination5 that is skill-based and, hence, functionally compa-
tible with a given social practice. Each of these social relations involves a 
particular variety of phenomenal nearness. Social relations can be traced 
to either an overt here or a tacit here (including a ditto there) depending 
on whether the subject skillfully engages with things and people or not. 
Here, what looks like yet another conceptual distinction may in fact be a 
bridge. By considering the embodied habits of the subject, we can account 
for the transition from the overt here to the there, that is, the transition 
from unskilled to skilled socio-material engagements; and the reason is 
that habits enable our skillful use of things. In other words, our habits, 
among other things, enable us to participate in social practices through 
skillful use of artefacts, instruments, objects, tools, and so on.
Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen
Department of Marketing and Management/ 
Department of Language and Communication
University of Southern Denmark
rga@sdu.dk
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Notes
 1  Latour also sometimes uses the term actant to describe the subject.
 2  This also goes against Husserl, who grounds his transcendental pheno-
menology in the Cartesian cogito. For Husserl, it is by means of having a 
cogito that we are able to become “acquainted with the world as immedia-
tely given” (Husserl 2012: 53).
 3  Perinat and Sadurní show that, at around 18 months of age, children begin 
to develop functional relations to objects, and thus become able to parta-
ke in socio-material practices in a very rudimentary way. Prior to these 
practical engagements, children down to 10 months of age also occupy 
themselves with objects, but they do so only through simple mani pulations 
(Perinat & Sadurní 1999: 63). These manipulations amount to unskilled 
fiddling, meaning that they lack a purpose and therefore also a phenome-
nal there.
 4  Compare also Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus.
 5  But also ‘derived’ singular engagements, such as when a person, in the ab-
sence of others, uses things in ways that are determined by social practi-
ces and conventions.
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